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FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER DOCTRINE 
WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE:   
RECONCILING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
PREEMPTION CASES 
Celeste Boeri Pozo* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Though the Constitution does not expressly grant the federal 
government a general power to direct the Nation’s foreign affairs, it 
specifically vests Congress and the President with the power to conduct 
particular foreign affairs activities.1  However, the federal government 
exercises broad authority over the foreign relations of the Nation.  In this 
sense, the whole of the federal government’s foreign affairs power is 
greater than the sum of all its constitutional parts.  The scope of states’ 
constitutional power is limited to what the Tenth Amendment reserves, 
but Article I, section 10 bars states from engaging in certain foreign 
affairs activities, such as entering into a treaty, without the consent of 
Congress.2  Exactly how much latitude states have to affect foreign 
affairs is a question of great contention and one on which the Supreme 
Court has been remarkably elusive. 
The federal government can invalidate state laws affecting foreign 
affairs in two ways.  It can preempt a conflicting state law affecting 
foreign relations by way of a statute or treaty,3 or, absent legislative or 
executive acts, federal courts can apply the dormant foreign affairs 
power to preempt state laws that improperly affect foreign affairs.4  This 
Article focuses on the relationship between these two methods of 
preemption in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of 
the dormant foreign affairs power.  Though the Supreme Court has 
overtly exercised the dormant foreign affairs power to preempt a state 
                                                 
*  Associate, Linklaters; J.D., University of Chicago Law School; B.A., Florida 
International University.  I am grateful for the support and encouragement my husband, 
William, gave me and for all of the feedback I received from my peers and the faculty at the 
University of Chicago Law School. 
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10; art. II, §§ 2-3. 
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; U.S. CONST.  art.  I, § 10. 
3 See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
4 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 275-76 (1st ed. 2003) [hereinafter BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW] (defining “dormant foreign affairs preemption” as “the power of federal courts to 
preempt state activities related to foreign affairs even in the absence of a controlling 
political branch enactment”). 
Pozo: Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine Wanted Dead or Alive:  Reconciling
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
592 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
statute only once,5 its other foreign affairs preemption cases seem 
incongruent with that exercise and have produced much confusion.6  The 
most recent case on the matter resulted in a divided court.7  
In encouraging further exploration as to the role of states “in a 
globalized, yet federal, world,” Edward Swaine comments on the lack of 
guidance current scholarship has to offer:  “We no longer 
know . . . whether there is any real doctrine of dormant foreign relations 
preemption, or when it applies . . . .”8  This Article seeks to resolve this 
uncertainty by offering a conceptualization of the whole federal foreign 
affairs power through a spectrum that captures the federal government’s 
varying degrees of authority over the conduct of foreign relations.  More 
specifically, this Article argues that reconciling the Supreme Court cases 
through the proposed spectrum analysis could provide lower courts 
with the tools necessary to resolve federal foreign affairs power conflicts 
with greater consistency.   
At one end of the spectrum, where federal authority is weakest, 
Congress and the President must muster all of their power to enact a 
conflicting law in order to preempt an existing state law.  At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, federal authority strengthens based on implicit and 
explicit constitutional authority, hence less congressional or executive 
action is necessary to preempt a state law.  The dormant foreign affairs 
power occupies the stronger end of the spectrum, whereby state law can 
be struck down regardless of federal inaction.  This Article will show 
that courts rely on constitutional and historical sources, as well as 
custom, to determine where on the spectrum to place the state law. 
Part II begins by tracing the source of the federal government’s 
foreign affairs power through an exploration of its constitutional and 
historical roots, as well as related Supreme Court cases.  It then analyzes 
the cases to find a common thread.  Part III proposes viewing the whole 
of federal foreign affairs powers in terms of a spectrum to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of conflict preemption and dormant 
                                                 
5 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (holding Oregon’s statute 
unconstitutional because “even in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign 
relations”). 
6 Compare Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down a 
state law related to foreign affairs with one country), with Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax 
Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (upholding a state law with far reaching international 
effects). 
7 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
8 Edward Swaine, The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 337, 
340 (2001). 
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foreign affairs preemption.  Part IV concludes that the spectrum analysis 
can lead to reconciliation of the case law and predictable future 
outcomes. 
II.  THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER 
The foreign affairs power of the federal government is akin to water:  
it takes several forms, is not always visible although we know it is 
present, and is vital to our existence as a unified nation.  The federal 
government can use its foreign affairs power to preempt state laws and 
policies in two ways:  first, by enacting a law or entering into a treaty 
that conflicts with the state law; or second, by virtue of its exclusive 
reservation of power in foreign affairs, regardless of whether it has 
exercised this power.  The first method is termed conflict preemption, 
and the second is called dormant foreign affairs preemption.9  
To recognize when the Court will invalidate a state act related to 
foreign affairs, it is necessary to define the limits of the foreign affairs 
power through an examination of its constitutional and historical 
sources.  Part II.A first reviews the Constitution’s explicit and implicit 
grant of foreign affairs powers to the political branches of the federal 
government and then turns to supplementary historical documents and 
Supreme Court cases interpreting the breadth of the foreign affairs 
power.  Part II.B searches for a common thread in the grounds the Court 
vocalizes as the basis for its holdings and contends that the cases cannot 
be reconciled on the Court’s words alone. 
A. Constitutional Roots and Supreme Court Cases 
The purpose of Part II.A is to demonstrate where in the Constitution 
the federal foreign affairs power stems from and how it has been applied 
by the Supreme Court.  Parts II.A.1, II.A.2, and II.A.3 divide the cases 
and related constitutional authority as follows:  dormant foreign affairs 
power, conflict preemption, and the Supreme Court’s most recent case 
on the issue. 
1. The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power 
The constitutional roots of the dormant foreign affairs power are 
somewhat convoluted because the Constitution does not directly grant 
the President and Congress a broad power to conduct all foreign affairs.  
                                                 
9 See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the dormant affairs power); infra Part II.A.2 (discussing 
conflict preemption). 
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However, the Constitution’s history and the explicit delegations of 
powers in matters such as war and diplomacy indicate that its overall 
design was to endow the federal political branches with almost all 
foreign affairs powers.  For instance, Congress has the power to provide 
a “common Defense,” regulate commerce with other nations, and declare 
war.10  Similarly, the President of the United States is entrusted with the 
authority to “make Treaties” and appoint and receive ambassadors.11  
Furthermore, Article I prohibits states from conducting certain forms of 
foreign affairs without the consent of Congress, such as entering into 
foreign treaties and engaging in war.12  
The founders called for the Constitutional Convention of 1787 for 
two principle reasons.13  First, the Articles of Confederation did not 
provide for a federal government with the authority necessary to 
effectively control foreign policy and defense.  Second, they wished to 
unify the nation with respect to other nations.  Accordingly, the first 
thirty Federalist papers each included at least some discussion of national 
security and foreign relations.14  Today courts continue to rely on 
statements from the founders to preserve the notion that the federal 
political branches have exclusive power over foreign affairs.15  
Other powers of the federal government may be deduced from its 
enumerated powers.  For instance, some find the President’s power to 
appoint and receive foreign ambassadors implies a power to recognize 
foreign governments and establish relations with them.16  Thus, the 
                                                 
10 U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 8. 
11 U.S. CONST.  art. II, §§ 2-3. 
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.  But see JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON 
YOUNG,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6.5 ( 3d ed. 1986) (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 
(1920)) (noting that the Tenth Amendment does not limit the federal government from 
using the treaty power to override a state law or policy). 
13 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., Foreword to DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ix (Univ. of Kan. 
Press 1996). 
14 See id.  Later Federalist papers also emphasized the value of having a federal 
government with a strong foreign affairs power.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James 
Madison) (“If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to 
other nations.”). 
15 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (citing Jefferson and Madison in 
support of the federal government being “entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility 
for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties”); see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 
539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (citing Hamilton and Madison for the proposition that “at some 
point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National 
Government’s policy”). 
16 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1245, 1296 (1996) (noting that federal foreign affairs powers are not limited to those 
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constitutional foreign affairs powers of the federal government may be 
conceived in a holistic manner.  Furthermore, in addition to the 
Constitution, the federal government has an inherent sovereign 
authority as an international actor, which it obtained by virtue of its 
independence from England.17 
Accordingly, the dormant foreign affairs power derives from the 
notion that the Constitution resulted from a historical need to grant 
broad and exclusive powers to the federal government for the effective 
conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs.  This notion essentially reserves 
certain activities to the federal branches alone so that states may not act 
regardless of whether any federal action has taken place.18  Zschernig v. 
Miller was the first case of the twentieth century to overtly rely on the 
dormant foreign affairs power to invalidate a state law.19  The case 
involved an Oregon statute that prohibited a nonresident alien from 
inheriting from an Oregon estate if he or she could not demonstrate that 
his or her home country would not confiscate the property and that it 
would grant Americans reciprocal inheritance rights.20  Though descent 
and distribution of estates is in the power of the several states, the Court 
found the international effect of Oregon’s statute, namely “judicial 
criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our 
own[,]” sufficient to invalidate it.21  The Court found the statute’s effect 
to be “an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the 
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress[,]”22 and 
conveyed that “even in absence of a treaty” state regulations capable of 
disturbing foreign relations “must give way if they impair the effective 
                                                                                                             
powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution).  But see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 38 (2d ed. 1996) (noting those powers 
derived from the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors at most suggest joint 
authority between the President and the Senate). 
17 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).  “As a result 
of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies, acting as a unit, the powers of external 
sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their 
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.”  Id. 
18 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 4, at 275-76. 
19 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
20 See id. at 440-41. 
21 Id. at 440. 
22 Id. at 430-32. 
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exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”23  These strong statements, 
written in a short opinion, provoked much controversy.24 
No Supreme Court case has had as broad a holding since Zschernig.  
Some scholars believed Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of 
California,25 curtailed or even ended the precedental value of Zschernig.26  
In Barclays, the Court upheld the constitutionality of California’s 
worldwide combined reporting requirement for calculating corporate 
franchise tax, notwithstanding its dramatic effect on foreign companies 
and governments and the Executive branch’s express disapproval of it.27  
The Court explained that because the issue presented was one of 
commerce, a power of Congress rather than international relations, only 
a conflicting federal policy expressed by Congress, rather than the 
Executive branch, could invalidate the state law.28  It then noted that 
Congress had studied the issue and chosen not to pass any of the 
proposed bills that would have barred such a taxing method, and thus 
Congress gave implicit permission to states to legislate in the area.29  
However, not all members of the majority agreed on this implicit 
                                                 
23 Id. at 440-41.  But see id. at 461-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Harlan did not feel 
the majority’s expansive holding was necessary and instead grounded his concurrence on a 
conflict with the United States Treaty of Friendship with Germany.  Id. 
24 See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, The Role of State and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L 
L.  821, 830 (1989) (mentioning “some aspects of the Zschernig doctrine of a ‘dormant’ 
foreign relations power are troublesome”); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, 
and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1649 (1997) (noting that Professor Henkin and Hans 
Linde both believed the dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine presented by 
Zschernig to be a new constitutional law). 
25 Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
26 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 865-66 (1997) 
[hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law]; Peter J. Spiro, The States and 
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.  J. INT’L L. 121, 164 (1994). 
27 Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324 n.22.  Seven countries, as well as members of the European 
Community, strongly disapproved of California’s reporting method and all filed amici 
briefs supporting Barclays, in addition to sending diplomatic notes.  Id.  Furthermore, the 
United Kingdom enacted retaliatory legislation.  Id. 
28 See id. at 329 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3).  “The Constitution expressly grants 
Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’”  Id.  
Though the statute was scrutinized under the Commerce Clause, the Court noted that “A 
tax affecting foreign commerce” raises an additional two concerns: (1) “the enhanced risk of 
multiple taxation”; and (2) “the Federal Government’s capacity to speak with one voice 
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.” Id. at 311 (internal 
quotations omitted).  The foreign affairs power was implicated under the “one voice” 
analysis.  Id. at 329. 
29 Given Congress’s purposeful inaction, the Court concluded “Congress implicitly has 
permitted the States to use the worldwide combined reporting method.” Id. at 326. 
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permission theory.30  Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, 
questioned the majority’s belief that California was able to impose 
multiple taxation on foreign corporations given the lack of express 
approval by Congress.31 
As a result, the Court found California’s tax method could not be 
preempted by an executive policy, let alone a federal dormant power 
intended to protect “the nation’s ability to speak with one voice,” despite 
the risk of imposing multiple taxation on foreign corporations.  Unlike 
Zschernig, which outright prohibited enforcement of state legislation 
affecting foreign policy without the support of Congress and the 
President, Barclays appeared to stand for the proposition that nothing 
short of a congressionally enacted law could have prevented California 
from implementing its taxing method worldwide.  
2. Conflict Preemption 
If Congress enacts a law that conflicts with a state law, the state law 
may be preempted based on a combination of the Supremacy Clause and 
the specific constitutional power that granted Congress the authority to 
enact the law in the first place.32  Such a situation is termed “conflict 
preemption,” and arises when a federal law and state law cannot both be 
complied with simultaneously.33  United States v. Belmont34 and United 
States v. Pink35 both involved a direct conflict between federal and state 
government policies over which was entitled to assets of the Soviet 
Union.  The Court held that an executive agreement, even one made 
                                                 
30 See id. at 331 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (disapproving of the Court’s finding that 
congressional inaction results in implicit permission); see also Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the 
Court’s reliance on a “‘negative implication arising out of more than 70 agreements’” and 
instead finding “what is clear is that the Federal Government has not provided the 
affirmative approval required to permit States to act”). 
31 Barclays, 512 U.S. at 336 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  “In my view, the States are 
prohibited (absent express congressional authorization) by the Foreign Commerce Clause 
from adopting a system of taxation that, because it does not conform to international 
practice, results in multiple taxation of foreign corporations.”  Id. 
32 U.S. CONST.  art. VI, cl. 2. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made . . . shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”  Id.; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1172 (3d. ed. 2000). 
33 See TRIBE, supra note 32, at 1176-77. 
34 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
35 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
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without any congressional involvement, had legal authority sufficient to 
preempt a conflicting state act.36  
In Belmont, the Court upheld the validity of an assignment of 
property in New York between the Soviet Union and United States 
governments made via an executive agreement, despite a conflicting 
state policy.37  The Court found that a state policy could not prevail over 
the international compact at issue,38 relying on United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.39 for the proposition that “complete power over 
international affairs is in the national government and . . . cannot be 
subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several 
states.”40  The opinion contained powerful language exerting the 
exclusivity of the federal government’s foreign affairs power:  
“Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is 
vested exclusively in the national government.”41  The majority in Pink, 
as in Belmont, also found the executive agreement generated by the 
Soviet Union’s assignment of assets to the United States took precedence 
over the state policy of New York on a similar set of facts.42  Together, 
Pink and Belmont paved the way for executive agreements to be treated 
                                                 
36 See id. at 230 (citing Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331) (holding that “Such international 
compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity” to a treaty 
and thus may be treated as supreme law); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (holding that an 
executive agreement preempted a state act because “the Executive had authority to speak 
as the sole organ of that government”). 
37 The assets at issue became property of the Soviet government in 1918 when it enacted 
a decree nationalizing and appropriating all Soviet property and assets worldwide.  
Belmont, 301 U.S. at 326.  In 1933, pursuant to an executive agreement, consisting of an 
exchange of diplomatic correspondence and negotiations without congressional consent, 
the Soviet government assigned the account to the United States government as a final 
settlement of claims between the two governments. Id. New York considered the 
transaction an act of confiscation contrary to its public policy and thus refused to honor the 
assignment.  Id. at 326-27, 330. 
38 See id. at 330. 
39 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936). 
40 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. 
41 Id. at 330-31.  “In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect 
of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”  Id. 
42 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-26 (1942) (finding Belmont determinative of the 
extraterritorial effect of the Litvinov Assignment).  Despite the similarity of the fact 
patterns, Justice Stone, who concurred in Belmont, dissented in Pink, because he felt the 
relevant diplomatic correspondence simply signified recognition of the Soviet government 
and thus no conflicting federal policy could be inferred with regard to preferences among 
creditors.  Id. at 249 (Stone, J., dissenting). Conversely, the majority found the Litvinov 
Assignment to be part of a “broad and inclusive” policy of recognition of the Soviet 
government that should be construed in line with its purpose to eliminate all friction—such 
as the settlement of claims—between the United States and the Soviets.  Id. at 224 (majority 
opinion). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/2
2006] Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine 599 
with “similar dignity” as Article II treaties and has led to executive 
agreements becoming quite powerful against state acts.43  These two 
cases significantly expanded methods by which the federal government 
can preempt conflicting state action.   
The federal government can also use the Supremacy Clause to 
invalidate a state law that is “occupying” the same field Congress has 
enacted a statute within, even if it would be possible to comport with 
both state and federal laws.44  This second form of conflict preemption is 
referred to as field preemption.  Though field preemption is technically a 
subdivision of conflict preemption,45 for purposes of foreign affairs 
analysis, it is best to distinguish field preemption from conflict 
preemption.  Hines v. Davidowitz provides an excellent example of field 
preemption.46  
In Hines, a Pennsylvania statute requiring all aliens to register 
annually with the state, where the state would in turn furnish aliens a 
card they must carry or risk criminal punishment, was invalidated 
because it interfered with federal action on the same issue and frustrated 
the uniform policy Congress intended to establish in passing the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940.47  The Court held that unlike states’ broad 
powers to tax concurrently with the federal government, “the power to 
restrict, limit, regulate, and register aliens as a distinct group is not an 
equal and continuously existing concurrent power of state and nation, 
but that whatever power a state may have is subordinate to supreme 
national law.”48 
The majority described the controversy as one of field preemption, 
whereby Congress fully occupied the field of alien registration and 
forbade the states from conflicting, interfering, curtailing, 
                                                 
43 See id. at 230 (finding the Litvinov Assignment has a “similar dignity” to treaties 
considered the “Law of the Land” under Article VI of the Constitution); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 
331. 
44 See TRIBE, supra note 32, at 1205. 
45 Id. (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 469 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)).  “‘[F]ield pre-emption 
may be understood as a species of conflict pre-emption: a state law that falls within a pre-
empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude 
state regulation.’”  Id. 
46 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (holding the Alien Registration Act 
preempted the state law because the power to regulate aliens cannot be concurrently held).  
But see id. at 75, 78-79 (Stone, J., dissenting) (concluding that Congress did not establish an 
exclusive alien registration system, therefore it has not “occupied the field,” and the state 
and federal law do not conflict). 
47 See id. at 72-74 (majority opinion). 
48 Id. at 68. 
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complementing, or enforcing additional or auxiliary regulations upon 
the federal scheme.49  Congress’s “constitutional duty ‘[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization’” was noted as further evidence of 
federal priority on the matter.50  The Court was also concerned with 
Congress’s historical role in developing a uniform immigration policy, 
including establishing the terms and conditions for entry and remedying 
the harsher, discriminatory requirements of the past.51  
A more recent example of field preemption over a discriminatory 
state statute is Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.52  In Crosby, the 
Court found that a Massachusetts law prohibiting state entities from 
purchasing goods or services from any corporation that did business 
with Burma conflicted with Congress’s ability to implement a unified 
policy under a federal act.53  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit held the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional in part on 
the ground that it interfered with the federal foreign affairs power as 
construed in Zschernig.54  However, the Supreme Court affirmed on the 
more narrow ground of field preemption based on a federal act Congress 
passed three months after Massachusetts passed its statute.55  The federal 
act established mandatory and conditional sanctions against Burma and 
delegated to the President the authority to potentially impose further 
sanctions.56  
The Court in Crosby focused primarily on Congress’s articulation of a 
national foreign policy over Burma and its delegation of “flexible 
discretion” to the President to limit or increase the sanctions,57 thereby 
avoiding entirely the much anticipated answer to whether the 
Massachusetts statute interfered with the federal foreign affairs power 
                                                 
49 See id. at 66-67. 
50 Id. at 66. 
51 Id. at 69-72 (noting Congress’s purpose was to protect against the bad practices of 
prior alien registration systems, which invaded personal liberty and were overly 
burdensome, and to form a harmonious set of laws on immigration and naturalization). 
52 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
53 See id. at 388. 
54 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding the 
Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutional on three independent grounds: (1) it interfered 
with the conduct of foreign affairs exclusive to the federal government; (2) it violated the 
Foreign Commerce Clause; and (3) it was preempted by a similar federal law). 
55 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. 
56 See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-167 (1977). 
57 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. 
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under Zschernig, as was found by the lower courts.58  Critics of 
Zschernig’s holding praised the Court’s narrow decision in Crosby.59  
However, some commentators found that Crosby did not signify a 
victory for Zschernig’s critics, and in fact felt it carried a tone similar to 
the dormant foreign affairs power.60 
After Crosby, the state of federal foreign affairs power still remained 
uncertain.  Zschernig indicated that the dormant foreign affairs power 
may invalidate a state law absent executive or congressional action.  
However, Barclays demonstrated that the federal government’s need to 
speak with a unified voice on all matters international is not without 
limits.  Pink and Belmont taught that a conflicting executive agreement 
can preempt state legislation, while Hines and Crosby indicated that a 
congressionally enacted law can occupy the field, thereby invalidating 
concurrent state legislation.  However, the question remained whether a 
wavering executive policy could occupy a field, despite congressional 
inaction, thereby preempting a concurrent state law that affected the 
nation’s ability to speak with one voice.  The Court answered this 
question in the affirmative in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi.61  
3. The Most Recent Supreme Court Case:  American Insurance Ass’n v. 
Garamendi  
Garamendi concerned a California statute with the purpose of better 
enabling Holocaust victims to collect insurance proceeds from policies 
that were confiscated by European governments and insurance 
companies during the Nazi era.62  The federal government has dealt with 
the compensation of Holocaust victims and their descendants since 
                                                 
58 See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45; Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 
290-91 (D. Mass. 1998). 
59 See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 215 
n.152 (noting that the trade group that filed the Crosby case stated that the Court’s ruling 
would “‘help put an end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy’”); Carlos Manuel 
Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1260-61 (2001). 
60 Vazquez, supra note 59, at 1262.  Professor Vazquez, of Georgetown University Law 
Center, stated “Crosby perpetuates foreign affairs exceptionalism” and “thus offers little 
cause for celebration to the critics of dormant foreign affairs doctrine.”  Id. 
61 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
62 In 1999, California passed the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (“HVIRA”), 
which required all California licensed insurers to provide information regarding every 
policy in Europe they, or a “related company,” had in effect from 1920 to 1945.  CAL. INS. 
CODE §§ 13800-13807 (West 1999).  Failure to provide such information led to suspension of 
the violating company’s insurance license.  Id. § 13806. 
Pozo: Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine Wanted Dead or Alive:  Reconciling
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
602 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
World War II,63 and in 1999 signed an executive agreement with 
Germany designating the International Commission on Holocaust Era 
Insurance Claims (“ICHEIC”) with the responsibility of maintaining a 
claims handling procedure.64  Though Congress was aware of the issue, 
its only involvement was requesting the Presidential Commission to 
promote the National Association of Insurance Commissioners to report 
on insurance companies’ Holocaust-related claims practices in their 
respective states.65  The Supreme Court invalidated California’s statute, 
holding that it was implicitly preempted despite the absence of 
congressional action in this area because it interfered with an established 
executive policy on repayment of insurance proceeds to Holocaust 
victims articulated in a series of executive agreements with Germany 
and Austria.66  
After Garamendi, it remains unclear why an executive policy alone 
could preempt state law in Garamendi, Belmont, and Pink, yet not in 
Barclays, or why congressional inaction was interpreted as acquiescence 
in Barclays, but not in Garamendi.  It is also uncertain how pivotal the 
existence of an act of Congress was in Crosby; Crosby may instead have 
affirmed the First Circuit’s dormant foreign affairs power holding.  The 
distinction between matters that are commercial or political in nature in 
these cases is opaque, as is the division separating when concurrent 
legislation is permissive, as in Barclays, and when it is not, as in Hines, 
Crosby, and Garamendi.  Finally, the vitality of Zschernig remains an open 
question because, though it has been cited in subsequent cases, its 
influence is difficult to discern. 
                                                 
63 In 1999, President Clinton and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröeder negotiated the 
establishment of the Foundation, “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future.”  The 
German government and German corporations contributed 10 billion Deutschemark ($5 
billion) to the Foundation for the repayment of Holocaust-era claims.  In return, President 
Clinton offered to take measures such as filing statements of interest in related United 
States litigation, in order for the Foundation to be regarded as “the exclusive remedy for all 
claims against German companies arising out of the Nazi era.”  Brief of Petitioner at 4, Am. 
Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722). 
64 The Bush administration also facilitated German negotiations concerning claims 
procedures and reiterated its policy in support of ICHEIC as the “exclusive remedy” to 
such claims in 2002.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 63, at 7. 
65 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 428. 
66 See id. at 421-23 (citing the German Foundation Agreement and the Agreement 
Relating to the Agreement of October 24, 2000 Concerning the Austrian Fund 
“Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation”). 
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B. The Search for a Common Thread 
The Supreme Court has generated a diverse body of case law 
concerning whether a state law affecting foreign affairs should be 
invalidated.  The Court traditionally prefers to use the route of statutory 
or treaty preemption rather than invoke constitutional powers, even 
when finding such preemption is a stretch.67  In fact, Zschernig is the only 
contemporary case in which the Court expressly relied on the foreign 
affairs power to invalidate a state law.68  When presented with the 
controversy over whether a state statute interfered with foreign affairs, 
the Court considered the following three factors in every case:  (1) 
whether there was a conflicting federal action; (2) the source of this 
federal action; and (3) the international effects of the state law.  
Individually, each case appears to soundly evaluate these factors.  
However, as will be discussed below, when the cases are studied as a 
whole, it is evident that these factors were not uniformly evaluated.  
Thus, none of these commonly identified factors serves as the common 
thread connecting the case law. 
The Court’s quest for a federal act that directly conflicts with the 
state action, and has the force of law, such as a statute or treaty, has at 
times been only halfway successful.  For example, a state act was 
preempted by a conflicting executive agreement in Pink and Belmont and 
a concurrent federal statute in Hines and Crosby, yet a conflicting 
executive policy was deemed insufficient to preempt the state statute in 
Barclays.  What made Garamendi remarkable—and Zschernig even more 
outstanding—was that despite the lack of both a direct conflict and a 
federal statute or treaty, the state law was still preempted.  The Court in 
Garamendi found conflict in a way that resembled field preemption, but 
relied on a different distribution of halfway success:  a concurrent 
executive agreement.69  The conflict found in Zschernig can best be 
described as an intrusion upon an area of the foreign affairs field 
reserved exclusively to the federal government, rather than an intrusion 
on a federal act taking place in this area.  This indicates that conflict is a 
loose concept and it is not necessarily determinative of preemption.   
                                                 
67 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting 
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).  
“The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity 
of deciding it.’”  Id. 
68 However, recall Justice Harlan concurred separately because he would have preferred 
to invalidate the state statute on the basis of a conflicting treaty.  See Zschernig v. Miller, 
389 U.S. 429, 461-62 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
69 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Garamendi). 
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Under conflict preemption analysis, the Court may find conflict 
when either the state act directly conflicts with a federal act so that 
compliance with both would be impossible,70 or where the two overlap 
and, as such, the state act “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”71  The 
latter reasoning—a subcategory of conflict preemption referred to as 
field preemption—was used to preempt state statutes in Hines and 
Crosby.72  The dormant foreign affairs preemption analysis used in 
Zschernig indicates that state acts conflicting with an area of foreign 
affairs delegated solely to the federal political branches will be struck 
down, though neither Congress nor the Executive branch have fully 
exercised their power in this area.  Garamendi lies somewhere in between 
the two forms of analysis because there had been a partial exercise of 
federal power through executive negotiations and agreements.73  
However, unlike Hines and Crosby, which relied on a federal statute to 
occupy the foreign affairs field, Garamendi uncommonly relied on a 
policy behind an executive agreement alone without Congress’s 
involvement.  This brings us to the Court’s second inquiry:  the source of 
the federal act.   
The source of the federal act, in terms of the amount of involvement 
Congress and the President had in generating the conflicting policy, 
varied widely from case to case.  In Crosby, both branches of government 
were involved, whereas only the Executive branch was active in Belmont, 
Pink, Garamendi, and Barclays.  Only Congress was active in Hines, and 
neither branch had acted at all in Zschernig.  In fact, congressional silence 
was interpreted as implicit approval of California’s statute in Barclays 
and the executive policy was disregarded, whereas Garamendi brushed 
aside Congress’s purposeful silence on the issue and instead focused on 
the executive policy.  In a sense, Garamendi is in line with Belmont and 
Pink for its sole reliance on an executive agreement, which contradicts 
Hines, Crosby, and Barclays74 due to its lack of Congressional consent, but 
                                                 
70 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (citing Fla. Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)) (finding preemption when it 
is impossible for private parties to both comply with state and federal law). 
71 Id. at 373 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
72 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Hines); supra notes 52-60 
(discussing Crosby). 
73 See supra Part II.A.3. 
74 The Court distinguished Barclays as a commerce case which requires congressional 
action.  However, the defendants in both Crosby and Garamendi argued that trade and 
insurance regulations are commercial in nature and should be left as matters for Congress 
to decide.  While the Court was understandably comfortable deeming a tax regulation as a 
commercial matter, and sanctions and war repayment claims as political matter, one can 
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is slightly more grounded than Zschernig because there is an affirmative 
federal act on which to rely.  This hodgepodge of reasoning indicates 
that the source of federal authority is not the common thread, and 
perhaps is not as initially controlling as one is otherwise led to believe.   
Finally, the Court gave varying degrees of attention to the gravity of 
international effects presented by state laws.  Concern over “incidental 
or indirect effect in foreign countries”75 is a subjective inquiry with 
unique applicability, which could easily vary according to the size and 
influence of the state’s economy.  Consequently, there is little consistency 
amongst the cases from this perspective as well.  Enforcement of the 
executive agreement in Belmont and Pink had critical political 
implications because the agreement was related to recognition of the 
new Soviet government.76  In both Garamendi77 and Barclays, California’s 
act threatened far reaching international economic effects, yet the Court 
found preemption in the former, but not the latter case.78  Moreover, 
Barclays brushed aside foreign actors’ complaints.79  Only Justice 
O’Connor, in her dissent, raised concern over the tax method’s 
international effects.80  
Conversely, the effect on foreign relations of the statutes at issue in 
Crosby, Hines, and Zschernig were more questionable than in former 
                                                                                                             
imagine scenarios where this line is more difficult to draw.  Thus, the distinction between 
commercial and political alone is not a satisfactory basis for resolving future cases. 
75 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968) (citing Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 
(1947)) (finding the state act must have more than “‘some incidental or indirect effect in 
foreign countries’” to be preempted). 
76 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“[C]oincident with the 
assignment set forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet government, and 
normal diplomatic relations were established . . . .”); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 
203, 211 (1942). 
77 In Garamendi, the severe punishment of California’s statute—suspension of insurance 
license—would either cause plaintiffs to forego their ability to conduct business in 
California, or provide information which would in some cases violate European privacy 
law, disrupt federal negotiations, and perhaps mark the end of the ICHEIC voluntary 
claims system. 
78 Given the size of California’s economy, it is able to substantially affect the world 
economy and international relations through such acts unlike other less influential states. 
79 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 320 (1994) 
(countering O’Connor’s finding that foreign corporations’ concerns should be addressed 
because they lack access to the political process of the United States by pointing to the 
“battalion of foreign governments” that came to their aid in “deploring worldwide 
combined reporting in diplomatic notes, amicus briefs, and even retaliatory legislation”). 
80 See id. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  “These adverse 
consequences, which affect the Nation as a whole, result solely from California’s refusal to 
conform its taxing practices to the internationally accepted standard.”  Id. 
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cases.81  In Crosby, a state law imposing barriers on trade with one small 
country was found to be “an obstacle in addressing the congressional 
obligation to devise a comprehensive, multilateral strategy.”82  The 
Court’s finding in Zschernig, that Oregon’s probate law “affects 
international relations in a persistent and subtle way,” when even the 
Justice Department did not find it problematic, is dubious at best.83  
Hines arguably did not present any substantial foreign relations 
problems in that it did not have incidental or indirect effects in foreign 
countries.84  Rather, its concern was over how the United States should 
document aliens once they have already arrived, not on how aliens 
should be treated based on the laws of their nation of origin—an 
assessment which could produce the judicial criticism contemplated in 
Zschernig.   
In view of the panorama of international effects and methods of 
review employed by the Court, the gravity of the international impact of 
the state statutes does not form the nucleus of the case law either.  
Furthermore, it would be odd to allow a less influential state to engage 
in an act prohibited to more influential states simply because it is not 
able to produce more than incidental international effects.  This analysis 
reveals that those factors most prominently discussed—mainly the 
existence of a conflicting federal act, the source of the act, and the 
international effects of the state statute—simply do not shed light on the 
incongruity between the cases.  Part III suggests that redefining the 
scope of the foreign affairs power in a manner that captures all forms of 
preemption—conflict preemption and dormant foreign affairs 
preemption—provides a clearer picture of this diverse legal landscape.   
III.  THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER SPECTRUM 
It is not immediately clear when an affirmative federal act, or what 
type of federal act, is necessary to preempt a state law affecting foreign 
                                                 
81 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (discussing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 
429 (1968)); supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52 (1941)); supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (discussing Crosby v. Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)). 
82 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 385.  Note that the obstacles presented by Massachusetts’s statute 
affected the Executive, not Congress.  “[T]he Executive has consistently represented that 
the state Act has complicated its dealing with foreign sovereigns . . . .” Id. at 383. 
83 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440; see also Bilder, supra note 24, at 825. 
84 However, the Court pointed to reciprocal international agreements, whereby the 
United States agreed to treat aliens in the same manner as its own citizens would be treated 
in that country, which may have been violated by the Massachusetts statute.  See Hines, 312 
U.S. at 65. 
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affairs.  The cases discussed above leave many questions open:  Would 
Massachusetts’s sanctions have been invalidated in Crosby absent a 
federal statute?  If Congress had enacted a federal Holocaust victim 
repayment act, would the Garamendi Court have instead based its 
decision on the act and ignored related executive agreements?  Since 
these questions have been left unanswered, the scope of the federal 
foreign affairs power is uncertain, making it difficult to predict when a 
state act involving foreign affairs will be invalidated.  
Given such confusing precedent, it is not surprising that the lower 
courts have fared no better and tend to have more extreme holdings.85  
For instance, the First Circuit Court and the district court in Crosby both 
held that the Massachusetts statute interfered with the foreign affairs 
power.86  However, as discussed above, the Supreme Court managed to 
skirt the dormant power question by solely focusing on preemption by a 
federal statute.87  Though the Court came closer to directly relying on the 
foreign affairs power in Garamendi, its treatment of the executive 
agreement as a quasi-treaty more closely resembled field preemption, 
rather than an affirmation of the foreign affairs power finding made by 
the district court.88 
Part III.A suggests the dormant foreign affairs power should be 
reconceptualized as part of a broad foreign affairs power spectrum, 
which includes conflict preemption, as a way of comprehensively 
uniting the cases.  Part III.B analyzes the method by which the Court 
determined where the contested state statute fell on the spectrum.  The 
state law’s position on the spectrum indicates the amount of federal 
action needed to preempt it.  Part III.C applies the spectrum analysis to 
lower court cases to demonstrate its efficacy. 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Ill. 1986) 
(holding a tax amendment purposefully excluding South Africa was “an impermissible 
encroachment upon a national prerogative”). 
86 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 51-52 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding 
the Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutional partly because it interferes with the 
conduct of foreign affairs exclusive to the federal government); Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding Massachusetts’s statute 
“unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate 
foreign affairs”). 
87 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at  388. 
88 See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Quackenbush, Nos. Civ. S-00-0506WBSJFM, 
Civ. S-00-0613-WBSJFM, CIV S-00-0779WBSFJM, CIV S-00-0875WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978, 
at *10 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2000) (holding plaintiffs proved probability of success on claim that 
California’s statute interferes with federal control over foreign affairs). 
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A. Reconceptualizing the Foreign Affairs Power 
There has been a fair amount of debate over the virtues of conflict 
preemption.89  The reality is that the Court has engaged in several forms 
of preemption.90  Conversely, the dormant foreign affairs power has been 
treated as something far removed from conflict preemption; in fact the 
estranged dormant power is even thought by some scholars to have 
perished after Zschernig.91  However, the lower courts have evidently not 
shared this view,92 and Garamendi may properly be interpreted as a 
revival of the dormant power.93 
This Article argues the dormant foreign affairs power—the notion 
that certain areas of foreign affairs are exclusively reserved for federal 
action—is akin to conflict preemption, specifically, its subcomponent 
termed “field preemption.”  Though conflict preemption only 
contemplates conflicting or concurrent federal acts, it is based on the 
notion that the federal government has priority to control certain areas of 
foreign affairs.  The dormant foreign affairs power similarly controls an 
area of the foreign affairs field—one within which states are prohibited 
                                                 
89 Justice Stone strictly believed the federal law must directly conflict with the state law 
for preemption to occur, whereas the majority trend favored a broader concept of conflict, 
including field preemption. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 315, 255 (1942) (Stone, J., 
dissenting) (“Treaties . . . have hitherto been construed not to override state law or policy 
unless it is reasonably evident from their language that such was the intention.”); Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 77 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“This Court has consistently held 
that treaties of the United States for the protection of resident aliens do not supersede such 
legislation unless they conflict with it.”); see also Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally? 
Dormant Federal Common Law Preemption of State and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 
53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 923, 932-65 (2003) (discussing arguments for and against preemption). 
90 See, e.g., Pink, 315 U.S. at 222-26 (overriding a state policy because it conflicted with an 
executive agreement); Hines, 312 U.S. at 68-74 (preempting a state law that occupied the 
same field as a federal law); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937) (holding 
that an executive agreement preempted a state act based on the Executive’s authority to 
speak as the sole voice of the government). 
91 See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 26, at 865 (“[T]here 
are reasons to think that Zschernig’s dormant foreign relations preemption retains little, if 
any, validity.”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 649, 688-92 (2002) (arguing America is past the high point of federal exclusivity over 
foreign affairs and in light of globalization should allow for more state activity in foreign 
affairs). 
92 See Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 306 (Ill. 1986) 
(citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968)).  The court relied on Zschernig for the 
proposition that even laws in areas traditionally controlled by the states “must give way if 
they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy.”  Id. 
93 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 395, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
“The Court’s analysis draws substantially on Zschernig v. Miller.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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from acting.  The difference between the two is whether the federal 
government has chosen to exercise its priority in the field.   
The federal government has varying degrees of authority within the 
broad foreign affairs field.  Thus, how the federal government can use its 
foreign affairs power to preempt state acts is best described in terms of a 
spectrum.  At the end where federal power is weakest, the political 
branches must exercise their power to the fullest to preempt explicitly 
conflicting state law.  At the opposite end, where federal power is 
strongest, the federal government’s exclusive authority is already 
reserved, and it therefore need not fully exercise its power.  In the 
middle, there is a range of areas where the states may or may not act 
concurrently with the federal government, and therefore, the degree of 
federal action required for preemption varies accordingly.  To preempt a 
state act, the foreign affairs power must be exercised with different levels 
of force according to which portion of the spectrum the state act 
occupies.  The closer a state’s act moves towards the conflict pole, the 
more federal action will be necessary to preempt it.  As a state’s act 
approaches the exclusive pole, less substantive federal action, such as 
loose executive policies, will suffice to preempt it.  Accordingly, where 
the federal government’s foreign affairs power is weakest, conflict 
preemption is necessary to invalidate the state law.  Where its foreign 
affairs power is the strongest, the courts can rely on dormant foreign 
affairs preemption. 
The spectrum implies that foreign affairs power is a zero sum 
calculation; the more power the federal government has over foreign 
affairs, the less the states have.  From the perspective of the states, the 
spectrum is reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s categorical separation of 
powers analysis—between Congress and the President—in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.94  Jackson categorized the President’s lowest 
ebb of power as the point in which the President “can rely only upon his 
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress 
over the matter.”95  Similarly, the foreign affairs power of the states, 
which is quite limited to begin with, is weakest at the exclusive pole 
where it is diminished by the federal dormant foreign affairs power.  
Jackson’s second category is represented by a “zone of twilight” where 
the President, acting without either a grant or denial of congressional 
authority, may in some instances have concurrent power.96  The middle 
                                                 
94 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
95 Id. at 637. 
96 See id. 
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of the spectrum also presents uncertainty for states and their ability to 
act concurrently, which similarly depends on “contemporary 
imponderables,” such as whether Congress occupied the field.97  Finally, 
Jackson noted, the President enjoys maximum authority when acting 
pursuant to express or implied authorization of Congress.98  States also 
have the greatest amount of power over matters affecting foreign affairs 
when, in addition to their constitutional powers, they are acting 
pursuant to federal authority as well.99 
The area of the spectrum a state has attempted to occupy correlates 
to the area of the foreign affairs field affected.  The “incidental or indirect 
effect[s]” to which the Court often referred are relevant insofar as they 
identify the type of foreign affairs activity the state is engaging in.100  The 
magnitude of the effects is much less important and the category of the 
state law—whether it is tax or insurance—is not necessarily 
determinative.  For instance, the Oregon statute at issue in Zschernig 
occupied an area of the foreign affairs field involving criticism of a 
foreign government, not probate.  Once the area of the foreign affairs 
field the state is acting within is identified, it is placed on the spectrum 
according to the amount of power the federal government has in that 
area.  Accordingly, Part III.B discusses how to determine what area of 
foreign affairs the state was engaged in.  
B. Defining the Foreign Affairs Spectrum 
The Court has relied on the Constitution, historical sources, and 
custom to identify which areas of foreign affairs belong exclusively to the 
federal government, but how these divisions were determined requires 
one to reconsider the factors motivating the Court’s decision in light of 
the spectrum analysis described above.  For instance, discussions in the 
opinions regarding the effect of a state act on foreign affairs helps to 
determine what area of the foreign affairs power spectrum the state is 
occupying.  On the other hand, while the federal source of authority—
whether it be Congress or the President—is important, it is a misleading 
starting point for an analysis of the federal government’s foreign affairs 
power because the government may in some cases have done more than 
                                                 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 635. 
99 In Barclays, California’s statute was upheld, despite its international effects, partly 
because the Court concluded that Congress had implicitly authorized it.  Barclays Bank v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 326 (1994). “Congress implicitly has permitted the 
States to use the worldwide combined reporting method.”  Id. 
100 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 
U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968). 
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it needed to in order to preempt a state law.101  In fact, one article 
suggests that Crosby would have had the same outcome regardless of 
whether or not Congress had passed a concurrent statute.102  Over the 
course of history, the political branches have enacted legislation, entered 
treaties, and developed policies on nearly every conceivable issue.  Thus, 
the Court will almost always be able to point to some federal action for 
preemption purposes should it choose to do so.  Therefore, 
understanding the distribution of federal power over the foreign affairs 
field in terms of a spectrum helps to determine when state acts will be 
preempted. 
The Constitution provides some clear parameters of the foreign 
affairs power.  For instance, states cannot declare war nor appoint 
ambassadors.103  Other federal powers, such as the power to recognize 
foreign governments, may be derived from the Constitution and 
implicitly mark federally exclusive boundaries.104  Other constitutional 
clauses allude to certain topic areas the federal government has greater 
authority over.  For instance, the Naturalization Clause points in favor of 
greater federal authority over immigration.105  Based on the Constitution, 
as well as custom and historical sources, the Court has thus far 
delineated the following boundaries for what constitutes an 
impermissible effect on foreign affairs for the several states.  Immigration 
registration is the province of Congress.106  International claims 
settlement is the province of the Executive.107  The federal political 
branches have priority in establishing sanctions against other 
                                                 
101 Conflict analysis becomes more important as the federal foreign affairs power 
weakens because as the state law moves closer to the conflict pole, it requires the Court to 
determine whether the tension between a state and federal act is sufficient to merit 
preemption. 
102 See Vazquez, supra note 59, at 1261-62.  “Crosby’s approach to preemption was so 
extraordinary that it would have yielded the same conclusion with respect to the 
Massachusetts Burma Law even if there had been no Federal Burma Law.”  Id. 
103 Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution delegates the power to declare war to 
Congress and Article II, § 2 delegates the power to appoint ambassadors to the President. 
104 See Clark, supra note 16, at 1296. 
105 U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress “To establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization”). 
106 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (finding that federal power over 
immigration, naturalization, and deportation is supreme). 
107 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (citing Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679, 682-83 (1981)); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 230 (1942); 
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) (finding “our cases have recognized 
that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, 
requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress . . . . Making executive 
agreements to settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a 
particularly longstanding practice . . . .”). 
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countries.108  States may not be critical of other countries’ systems of 
governance.109  Taxes, however, can be concurrently legislated.110  The 
following diagram illustrates where the cases fall within the spectrum 
analysis. 
Spectrum Diagram 
Weak Federal Power          Strong Federal Power 
 
Barclays     Crosby, Hines Pink, Belmont   Garamendi   Zschernig 
The Court mentioned the Naturalization Clause in Hines to support 
the supremacy of the Alien Registration Act.111  There, Pennsylvania 
clearly attempted to occupy the area of foreign affairs related to 
immigration.  Historical sources and custom were also contributing 
factors in concluding that “the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and 
register aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously 
existing concurrent power of state and nation, but that whatever power a 
state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.”112  Given the 
constitutional base and historical practice of federal regulation over 
immigration, the Court placed the state statute off-center on the 
spectrum—slightly closer to the dormant power pole—because of its 
intolerance for concurrent legislation.  As such, the Court found the 
congressional action in this area sufficient to trump the state law.  
Crosby clarified that declaring sanctions against foreign countries is 
also an area in which the federal government has priority, and therefore, 
concurrent legislation is not permitted.113  Clearly, Massachusetts was 
                                                 
108 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366-68, 372 (2000) (finding 
that a state law barring the purchase of goods from a particular foreign country is 
preempted because Congress intended to occupy that area of the foreign affairs field). 
109 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968). 
110 See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 327 n.28 (1994) (internal 
citations omitted).  “‘Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a well-
established norm.’”  Id. 
111 Hines, 312 U.S. at 66.  “[S]pecialized regulation of the conduct of an alien before 
naturalization is a matter which Congress must consider in discharging its constitutional 
duty ‘To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.’”  Id. 
112 Id. at 68; see also id. at 62 n.9 (citing Federalist papers to find supremacy of national 
power over foreign affairs); id. at 64-65 (recounting history and tradition of federal 
involvement in protecting and recognizing rights of aliens on U.S. soil). 
113 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374-80 (finding Congress intended to control economic 
sanctions against Burma by delegating flexible authority to the President and therefore a 
state law attempting to do the same could not exist). 
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attempting to occupy a portion of the foreign affairs field related to 
economic reprisals against foreign governments. Congress’s 
constitutional authority to enact sanctions against Burma and delegate 
power to the President to manage the sanctions is so clearly established, 
it did not require ample discussion in the opinion.  Sanctions therefore 
fall on a similar part of the spectrum as do immigration regulations, 
where concurrent legislation is not permitted and federal action just 
short of congressional enactment may arguably suffice to preempt the 
state law.  
The Court’s finding that the settlement of international claims is the 
occupation of the Executive branch is also derived from the Constitution 
and traditional practice.  Garamendi, Pink, and Belmont all found the 
President’s ability to settle claims to be an indisputable power that has 
been exercised since the Constitution’s inception, and has historically 
received congressional acquiescence.114  “Making executive agreements 
to settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a 
particularly longstanding practice. . . .”115  This places international 
claims settlement closer to the dormant foreign affairs preemption pole, 
where a reduced amount of federal activity in the form of an executive 
agreement is sufficient to preempt state law. 
Taxation, on the other hand, is an area that has traditionally been 
concurrently legislated.  However, a levy that causes multiple taxation, 
or prevents the federal government from speaking with one voice over 
commercial regulation matters, is unconstitutional.116  Thus, while the 
threshold for preempting a tax law—even one with dramatic 
international effects—is higher, it is not unsurpassable.117  Barclays held 
that Congress is the voice of the Nation charged with evaluating 
“whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state 
autonomy.”118  Tax laws and policies therefore generally occupy the 
                                                 
114 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 
203, 240 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937). 
115 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 
(1981)); see also id. at 414 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 
(1952)).  “[T]he historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the 
Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of 
our foreign relations.’”  Id. at 415. 
116 See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450-51 (1979). 
117 Taxes affecting foreign commerce raise two additional concerns, above and beyond 
the usual Commerce Clause test.  See supra note 28. 
118 Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994). 
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conflict end of the spectrum, which requires federal enactment of a law 
in direct conflict with the state policy.119  
Zschernig is the most difficult to place on the spectrum because it is 
not self-evident what area of the foreign affairs spectrum the Oregon 
statute occupied.  Though probate is traditionally an occupation of the 
state, the Court was not as concerned with the administration of probate 
as it was with judicial criticism of foreign governments.120  Therefore, the 
Oregon statute’s incidental effects on foreign affairs consisted of 
discrimination and political criticism of a different political system.121  
The fact that it was a probate statute that provoked such criticism, rather 
than a tort statute for example, is likely irrelevant.  Accordingly, 
Zschernig indicated that state statutes criticizing, and perhaps even 
discriminating against aliens based on their home country’s form of 
government, fall into the extreme dormant foreign affairs preemption 
end of the spectrum, which will automatically invalidate state statutes 
regardless of federal action.  Hence, the spectrum analysis provides a 
coherent method, in line with the Court’s findings, of assessing whether 
the federal foreign affairs power may preempt a state law. 
C. Application of the Spectrum Analysis 
The spectrum analysis is useful to gauge whether there has been 
sufficient federal action to preempt a state law affecting foreign affairs.  
The absence of a clear dormant foreign affairs power doctrine, combined 
with the Supreme Court’s broad application of conflict preemption, has 
resulted in lower courts developing multiple tests and standards and 
narrowly focusing on elements of Garamendi without considering the 
larger body of case law within which it falls.122  By applying the 
spectrum analysis to four lower court cases, this Part will demonstrate 
how the analysis can provide uniformity and clarity. 
                                                 
119 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 53, 68 (1941) (explaining the state’s power to 
concurrently legislate over alien registration is “not bottomed on the same broad base as is 
its power to tax”). 
120 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968).  “The statute as constructed seems to 
make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis 
than our own.”  Id. 
121 A more narrow reading of Zschernig interprets the case to mean that state statutes 
provoking inquiry and judicial criticism of a foreign country’s form of government are 
impressible.  See HENKIN, supra note 16, at 240.  It may prove that “Zschernig v. Miller 
excludes only state actions that reflect a state policy critical of foreign governments . . . .”  
Id. 
122 See Chiang, supra note 89, at 967-68.  “It is difficult to ascertain whether the lower 
courts are even consciously applying a particular doctrinal test . . . or whether they are 
instead making ad hoc determinations . . . .”  Id. 
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 In Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois held an amendment to the state tax statutes, which purposely 
excluded South African coins and currency from a tax exemption, was 
unconstitutional because it intruded upon the federal foreign affairs 
power.123  Yet, the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld an ordinance 
requiring city pension funds to divest their holdings in any companies 
conducting business in or with South Africa or Namibia.124  Though the 
courts attempted to create a meaningful distinction between these two 
cases, it was hardly accomplished.125  Both cases involved a local 
government’s attempt to restrict its business dealings with a foreign 
government of which it disapproved.126  To add to the confusion, in a 
more recent case, the United States District Court of the Central District 
of California relied on Garamendi to dismiss state law tort claims against 
United States corporations for torts allegedly committed in Columbia 
based on the effect such litigation could have on general United States 
sovereign relations with the Columbian government.  In contrast, the 
United States District Court of the District of Columbia had upheld state 
law tort claims brought by Indonesian citizens against a United States 
corporation for torts it allegedly committed in Indonesia.127 
The spectrum analysis would have reached the same conclusion in 
Springfield without having to balance innumerable considerations on 
how the Illinois statute would possibly affect the Nation’s foreign policy-
making power.128  The decisive characteristic is not that it was a tax 
statute, but rather, as the court correctly noted, that it was a form of 
                                                 
123 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986). 
124 Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Baltimore v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989). 
125 See id. (distinguishing itself on the basis that Springfield involved state efforts to 
“structure relationships between its residents” and South Africa, whereas the Baltimore 
ordinance was “primarily an attempt by the City to structure its own financial affairs”). 
126 See id.  The purpose of the ordinance was “simply to ensure that the City’s pension 
funds would not be invested in a manner that was morally offensive to many Baltimore 
residents . . . .”  Id.; Springfield, 503 N.E.2d at 307 (noting “the exclusion’s sole motivation is 
disapproval of a nation’s policies”). 
127 See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  But 
see Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, No. Civ. A. 01-1357(LFO), 2006 WL 516744, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 2, 2006) (“Mujica misconstrues and misapplies the foreign affairs doctrine.”). 
128 See Springfield, 503 N.E.2d at 307.  The court’s reasoning for invalidating the state 
amendment was multifaceted and included: demonstrating disapproval of a foreign 
government, targeting a particular country, disrupting the Nation’s ability to speak with 
one voice, limiting national foreign policy choices, and implementing an economic boycott.  
Id.  The latter is a power states are not authorized to exercise independently.  Id. 
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international economic boycott.129  The Illinois tax amendment fell 
between Zschernig and Crosby on the foreign affairs spectrum because, 
though there tends to be federal exclusivity over international boycotts, 
the tax amendment was not as extreme as Zschernig in that it did not 
provoke judicial criticism of a foreign government.  Yet, it was slightly 
closer to the exclusive pole than Crosby, because it was not limited to 
state government purchases and could influence private parties’ 
purchasing decisions.  This placement on the spectrum requires some, 
albeit limited, federal action to preempt a state statute, which is found 
here in the form of an executive order.130  In light of the statute’s 
placement on the spectrum, this partial occupation of the field by the 
Executive branch was sufficient for preemption and thus would not 
change the court’s conclusion. 
The same cannot be said for the decision in Baltimore, where the 
court split hairs to distinguish the case from Springfield.131  The court 
found that the city ordinance forcing divestment of pension funds 
related to South Africa did not intrude on the federal foreign affairs 
power because it only had an “incidental or indirect effect in foreign 
countries.”132  However, Baltimore’s economic ability to impact foreign 
relations should not be a determinant of the legality of its acts.  The 
divestment statute at issue was similar in many respects to 
Massachusetts’s statute in Crosby, thereby placing it on the same point on 
the spectrum.133  In the aftermath of Crosby, it is evident that there was 
sufficient federal activity concerning South Africa to find field 
preemption in Baltimore.134  Accordingly, in Baltimore, the court should 
have invalidated the Baltimore ordinance. 
In Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., a series of mostly tort claims 
were filed against two defendants, a United States corporation located in 
                                                 
129 See id.  “[T]he practical effect of the exclusion is to impose . . . an economic boycott,” 
which is “outside the realm of permissible State activity.”  Id. 
130 See id. at 302-04 (discussing scope of Executive Order 12535 banning future 
importation of South African gold coins known as Krugerrands). 
131 See Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Baltimore v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 562 
A.2d 720, 748 (Md. 1989). 
132 Id. at 749. 
133 Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 56 (1st Cir. 1999).  “[Baltimore], 
whether rightly or wrongly decided, does not alter our decision that the Massachusetts 
Burma Law . . . goes far beyond the limits of permissible regulation under Zschernig.”  Id. 
134 Baltimore, 562 A.2d at 740.  The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5051-5060 
(2000), contained several restrictions, such as a prohibition against the importation of 
certain South African products, including Krugerrands, uranium, and coal, and limitations 
on American loans to the South African government.  Id. 
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California that operated a joint venture with the Columbian government 
over an oil production facility in Columbia, and a United States 
corporation located in Florida that provided security services for the 
protection of the oil pipeline, for injuries caused by a bombing raid the 
defendants allegedly conducted against civilians in Santo Domingo, 
Columbia, in connection with their protection of the oil pipeline.135  
Though the entire case was dismissed because the court found it was not 
justiciable under the political question doctrine, earlier in the opinion the 
court incorrectly dismissed the remaining state law tort claims pursuant 
to the foreign affairs doctrine.  The court held that “strong federal foreign 
policy interests outweigh[ed] the weak state interests involved”136 by 
narrowly relying on language in Garamendi referring to Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Zschernig.137  The court misapplied this preemption 
analysis because there was no conflicting state law for federal law or 
foreign policy to preempt.138  Instead, the issue addressed by the court 
was whether the pursuit of certain state law tort claims would interfere 
with the foreign policy of the United States.   
Under the spectrum analysis, this case would fall at the end of the 
pole where federal power is weakest because under any constitutional, 
historical, or customary analysis, absent any targeted scheme to 
                                                 
135 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183-88 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
The plaintiffs, Columbian citizens who were civilian residents of Santo Domingo injured by 
the bombing raid, brought various actions under the Alien Tort Statute, Torture Victim 
Protection Act, and state law.  Id.  However, for purposes of applying the spectrum 
analysis, only the court’s review of the state law claims of wrongful death, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress were 
considered.  Id. 
136 Id. at 1188. 
137 See id. at 1186-87 (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003)).  In 
describing Justice Harlan’s view in Zschernig, the Garamendi Court explained that in 
evaluating a conflicting state law, one aspect that it would be reasonable for courts to 
consider before declaring preemption is the strength of the state interest weighed against 
whether the state law will cause more than an incidental effect in conflict with express 
United States foreign policy.  Id.  Interestingly, the court in Mujica noted that Garamendi had 
not “explicitly adopt[ed] this two-tiered approach in its opinion” which it used as the basis 
for its holding.  Id. at 1187. 
138 Even if there had been a conflicting state law to consider, the court did not fully 
review California’s state interest.  The court simply found California’s interest to be weak 
because the plaintiffs were not residents of California and the torts did not take place in 
California.  The Court did not consider potential effects the defendants’ behavior and 
actions abroad could have on California.  See Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-
1357(LFO), 2006 WL 516744, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2006) (finding that the United States “has 
an overarching, vital interest in the safety, prosperity, and consequences of the behavior of 
its citizens, particularly its super-corporations conducting business in one or more foreign 
countries”). 
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influence United States foreign affairs, basic state tort laws are well 
within the “traditional competence” of the states.139  Therefore, in order 
to preempt claims under such laws there would have to be a directly 
conflicting federal law or treaty that specifically prohibited such tort 
cases under similar circumstances.  Here, no such conflicting federal law, 
treaty, or express United States foreign policy existed, nor was there a 
substantial element of judicial criticism (as in Zschernig) or international 
boycotting (as in Crosby) directed at the Columbian government.  
Instead, the court relied on loose standards of possible effects such 
litigation could have on diplomatic relations with the Columbian 
government as described in the United States State Department’s 
Supplemental Statement of Interest.140  While courts must give weight to 
statements of interest, they do not have sufficient authority to serve as 
the sole basis on which to invalidate a state law claim.  Given the 
placement of this case on the end of the spectrum where federal power is 
weakest, a general foreign policy of cooperation is an insufficient basis 
on which to discredit otherwise valid state law tort claims, and, as such, 
these claims should not have been dismissed on these grounds. 
Exxon would fall in the same place on the spectrum analysis as 
Mujica because it also involved basic state law tort claims brought by 
foreign nationals against a United States corporation.141  There was also 
no conflicting state law, and therefore, the court rightly concluded that 
the Garamendi analysis was not applicable.142  Absent any federal law or 
                                                 
139 See Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.  The Mujica court also contends that the claims are 
within the “traditional competence” of the state.  Id. 
140 The conflicting foreign policy the court points to is broad and vague and could apply 
in any case involving any foreign country that has an international component.  For 
example, the court stated that an important U.S. foreign policy is the encouragement of 
foreign governments to establish proper legal mechanisms to resolve alleged human rights 
controversies.  See id. at 1188.  The court also stated that there is a possibility that 
Columbian courts may resolve the dispute differently and thereby risk creating the 
perception that Columbian judicial institutions lack legitimacy, which could have 
potentially “negative consequences for our bilateral relationship with the Columbian 
government.”  Id.  However, there is no specific mention within the case of a conflicting 
express U.S. foreign policy, nor of a conflict with the United States government’s 
involvement in establishing or relying upon a mechanism for resolving this dispute. 
141 For purposes of applying the spectrum analysis, only those state law claims that were 
upheld in Exxon were considered. 
142 See Exxon, 2006 WL 516744, at *3.  “Here . . . there is [sic] no encroachments by any 
state on to the federal field of foreign affairs.”  Id.; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 393 F. 
Supp. 2d 20, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that the claims against Exxon do not generally 
interfere with U.S. foreign policy). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2007], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss2/2
2006] Foreign Affairs Power Doctrine 619 
treaty prohibiting such actions, the court rightly concluded that the state 
law claims were permitted to go forward.143 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Just as “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending 
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress”; so too do 
the powers of state governments to affect foreign affairs fluctuate 
depending upon the level of power the federal government has on the 
matter.144  Though at first glance, the Supreme Court cases provide little 
insight as to the status of the dormant foreign affairs power, further 
analysis reveals a connection between conflict preemption and dormant 
foreign affairs preemption in the form of a spectrum.  Thus, dormant 
foreign affairs preemption serves as one pole of a broad spectrum 
encompassing all federal foreign affairs related powers, where conflict 
preemption serves as the opposite pole.  Most cases fall somewhere in 
between.145 
The international incidental effects findings made by the Court 
helped determine in which area of foreign affairs the state was engaging.  
Constitutional and historical sources, as well as custom, defined the 
amount of power the federal government has over particular areas of the 
foreign affairs field.  The more power the federal government has over 
an area of foreign affairs, the closer it approaches the dormant foreign 
affairs power pole, and thus, less federal action is needed to preempt the 
state law.  The weaker the federal power over an area of foreign affairs, 
the further along the conflict pole of the spectrum the area will fall 
within, and thus, more federal action—in the form of a explicitly 
conflicting statute—will be necessary to preempt the state law.  The 
differences between the aforementioned Supreme Court cases can 
therefore be reconciled within the spectrum because it accounts for 
variations in level of conflict, federal source, and international effects. 
                                                 
143 The court did caution that it would carefully manage the discovery process in 
consideration of the sensitivities of the government of Indonesia.  See Exxon, 393 F. Supp. 
2d at 29.  “These [state law tort] claims are allowed to proceed, with the proviso that the 
parties are to tread cautiously.  Discovery should be conducted in such a manner so as to 
avoid intrusion into Indonesian sovereignty.”  Id. 
144 Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
145 While extreme, as Zschernig-like reasoning may no longer be invoked because 
currently there are few, if any, matters remaining on which the federal government has not 
legislated or formed policy, Zschernig is not ineffectual in that it serves as an anchor for the 
dormant foreign affairs preemption pole of the spectrum. 
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